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Reasons and Real Selves
MANUEL VARGAS
University of San Francisco
Most accounts of responsibility begin from either of two prominent points of
departure: the idea that an agent must have some characterological or expressive
connection to the action, or alternately, the idea that an agent must be in some sense
responsive to reasons.1 Indeed, we might even understand much of the past couple
of decades of philosophical work on moral responsibility as concerned with
investigating which of these two approaches offers the most viable account of moral
responsibility. Here, I wish to revisit an idea basic to all of this work. That is, I
consider whether there is even a fundamental distinction between these approaches.
I will argue that the relationship between these two approaches to moral
responsibility is much more complicated than is ordinarily assumed. I shall argue that
there are reasons to think that one of these views may ultimately collapse into the
other, and if not, that there is nevertheless reason to think one of these views has
misidentified the features of agency relevant to moral responsibility. The view that
follows is one that we might call the primacy of reasons. In the second half of the article
I consider whether recent experimental work speaks in favor of the alternative to the
primacy of reasons. Its proponents argue that it does. I argue that it does not. 
1. Real Selves and Reasons: Some initial considerations
One inspiration for those accounts of responsibility that emphasize a
characterological or expressive connection between agent and action is the idea that
it can only make sense to hold someone responsible if the action in some way
expresses a deep fact about the particular agent. Contemporary versions have
variously emphasized that the agent needs to “identify” with the motives that lead to
the act, or the act has to be expressive of a “Real Self” or the agent’s values, or the
action has to be an expression of the regard in which the agent holds others.2
Following the customary parlance given to us by Susan Wolf, I will call such
accounts Real Self views, or RS views.3 The label is imperfect, for it is not obvious
that all accounts that appeal to a condition of identification or self-expression need
be committed to the existence of a “real self” in any substantive way. Nevertheless it
is a serviceable misnomer because it emphasizes the idea of some special or
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privileged subset of psychological states in relation to which the agent’s actions must
stand for there to be responsibility.
If RS accounts emphasize that the mark of responsible agency is the presence
of psychological structures that, roughly, express some privileged view of the agent’s,
the mark of its alternative —Reasons accounts— is the presence of a particular
power to respond to the world. On these latter accounts, the agential contribution to
responsibility is a power to respond to the reasons that arise from the world or the
agent’s psychology’s interaction with the world. On this account, what makes
responsible agency distinctive is that the agent’s response to the world is structured
by reasons in a particular way. It is not the projection of the agent’s identity or
convictions that makes action responsible but rather how the agent’s actions express
(or don’t) due sensitivity to reasons.4 
Characterized in this way, the difference between RS accounts and Reasons
accounts may seem extraordinarily thin. One might wonder whether the manner in
which one responds to reasons is just a way of expressing one’s character,
commitments, or values. And, one might suspect that one’s character, commitments,
and values say something about what the agent regards as reasons-giving. If so, then
even if RS views and Reasons accounts can claim to have different points of
theoretical departure, those departure points are surely not far apart. At the very least
it suggests that the subject matter of theories of moral responsibility is not so
radically bifurcated so as to suggest that there are distinct phenomena that are
mistakenly given the single label of ‘moral responsibility’. 
Whatever the similarity of starting point, RS approaches face some distinctive
worries. Consider, for example, a paradigmatic RS account—Harry Frankfurt’s, as
presented in the 1971 article “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.”5
On Frankfurt’s account, an agent is responsible for some action if and only if at the
time of action the agent had a particular second order desire— i.e., a desire that the
motivating first order desire be effective in action. Notice that the higher order desire
need not be causally efficacious itself— it could be “along for the ride,” so to speak,
and its presence or absence might play no causal role in whether the agent acts on
some particular first order desire. So, on Frankfurt’s account, a willing addict is
morally responsible for a decision to take his drug of choice even if the higher order
desire that one act on the drug-taking desire plays no causal or explanatory role in
the taking of the drug. 
Frankfurt’s account and its subsequent developments have been construed in
different ways —as, for example, a picture of autonomy, of free will, of responsible
agency, of “strong agency” and so on.6 Construed as an account of the kind of
agency required for moral responsibility, however, the picture in “Freedom of the
Will” provides at least three reasons for consternation. First, on Frankfurt’s account,
all that matters for securing responsibility is the presence of the requisite
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psychological structure, regardless of its origin. This entails some startlingly
counterintuitive possibilities. For example, an agent that has an alien set of values
transplanted by coercive indoctrination, brainwashing, or (currently science fictional)
neurological implantation would, it seems, count as straightforwardly responsible for
any action subsequent to the implantation. Second, an insufficiently knowledgeable,
or a systematically delusional agent, is hardly a model of responsibility, no matter
how self-identified.7 Yet, on Frankfurt’s account it seems that we must say that such
an agent is a responsible agent. A natural way to respond to such worries is to appeal
to the rationality of the agent’s beliefs, or to a connection between agents, norms,
and the structure of the world. But if we supplement the account in this way, then it
looks less distinctive as an alternative to reasons accounts. Thirdly, the account is
silent on the matter of why, precisely, it is that second order desires are the sort of
thing that provide a basis for moral responsibility.8 A second order desire is still a
desire, and the fact of it being of the second order does not seem to, by itself,
constitute any reason to regard it as expressing where the agent stands. One way of
understanding the criticism is that it is unclear why the fact of where some agent
stands, were it tractable in terms of hierarchies of desires, should be the kind of thing
in virtue of which moral praise and blame make sense. 
I wish to focus on this latter criticism, that we need some account of why
those psychological elements identified by a RS account are sufficient for grounding
the appropriateness of praise and blame. One way to appreciate the force of the
worry is to consider an appeal to psychological states that are manifestly irrelevant to
grounding moral praise and blame. For example, if someone were to argue that it
was hierarchies of jealousy, or hierarchies of beliefs, or hierarchies of hunger that
determined the appropriateness of moral responsibility, we would surely demand an
explanation of why such things are at all relevant to moral responsibility. In the case
of desires, the idea that they have some connection to warranting praise and blame is
an old one. Nevertheless, we can and should ask why hierarchies of desires should be
the sort of things that warrant praise and blame. 
There are a number of things the Real Self theorist might say in the face of
this challenge.9 For example, perhaps the reason why higher order capacities are
significant for moral responsibility is precisely because they reflect some further fact
about the agent, and in virtue of that further fact, praise and blame come to make
sense. Frankfurt suggests something very much like this in the context of considering
whether creatures other than humans might count as having higher order desires. He
writes “No animal other than man, however, appears to have the capacity for
reflective self-evaluation that is manifested in the formation of second-order desires”
(12). If I understand Frankfurt rightly, his claim is that there is a comparatively
unusual capacity required before one can have second-order desires, something he
calls “the capacity for reflective self-evaluation.” It is this capacity that sets humans
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apart from other animals, and in virtue of which we come to be able to have second-
order desires. Higher order desires are a kind of proof for its existence, for one could
not have such desires without a capacity for reflective self-evaluation. So, perhaps,
the thought is that those capacities are part of what makes the presence or absence
of hierarchies of desire relevant for moral responsibility.
The existence of this enabling capacity raises some puzzles about Frankfurt’s
account. In particular: what is doing the explanatory or normative work in the
account? If higher order evaluations are really products of some more basic feature,
why not look to that distinctive capacity as the locus of freedom, personhood, and
moral responsibility? Indeed, what seems to give those higher order desires any force
or relevance at all for the matter of responsibility is that they are the products of
reflective self-evaluation. For example, if they were simply brute desires, or products
of unmediated instinct, it would be difficult to see how they could support the
distinction Frankfurt is looking for, one where on one side we have unremarkable
animals, and on the other side we have agents capable of personhood, freedom, and
moral responsibility. What makes second-order desires special seems to be precisely
that they are the products of reflective self-evaluation. So, perhaps what Frankfurt
should have said is that it is not second-order desires, per se, that matter for
distinguishing responsible agents from nonresponsible agents. Responsible agents
are, in some way, a byproduct of a more fundamentally important capacity, and it is
something about this underlying capacity that makes sense of the appropriateness of
praising and blaming. 
One consequence of replying in this way is that Frankfurt’s account threatens
to collapse into a de facto Reasons account. It is difficult to see how the capacity for
self-reflection is not just self-directed rational assessment. Frankfurt’s “reflective self-
evaluation” seems to be a self-aware, self-directed form of those capacities
emphasized by Reasons accounts: i.e., reflective self-control, or the capacity to
recognize and appropriately respond to reasons.10 To be sure, he seems to have in
mind a particular subset, or perhaps a particular application of those abilities—
namely, those tied to self-awareness. Still, ultimately we are left with an appeal to a
species of rational power. If so, then we have come to the startling conclusion that
Frankfurt’s account is really committed to a species of the Reasons approach. 
The foregoing suggests that the paradigmatic RS account is not itself a
genuine, distinctive option in the way ordinarily regarded in the literature.11 In turn
this might suggest a view we can call the primacy of reasons. On this view, our rational
capacities are central to moral responsibility, and purportedly alternative accounts
will, on closer inspection, either smuggle in a commitment to rational capacities or
prove to be inadequate. In the face of such a view, one could rightly object that even
if one accepts that Frankfurt’s account is vulnerable to concerns about its force
deriving from the role of rational powers, this need not be true of any and every RS
- 4 -
account. It would require a good deal more discussion than I have offered to show
that other or all RS accounts ultimately bottom out into a story of rational powers.
Fair enough. Still, we might take the present reflections to generate a challenge to
extant RS accounts: is there any reason to think that the psychological features
highlighted by one’s preferred RS account have some special status, apart from their
genesis in the rational faculties of agents? Put differently, what RS theorists need are
two interconnected things: (1) an account of why the psychological structures they
identify are the kinds of things in virtue of which agents can be responsible, and (2)
an explanation of why the normative relevance of those structures is not ultimately
parasitic on, or reducible to the exercise of the capacities that constitute the heart of
Reasons accounts. 
2. A new argument for RS theories? 
Going forward, I will assume that RS accounts face the two-pronged challenge
mentioned above. Now I wish to consider one way in which the proponents of RS
accounts might reply. In its basic elements, the reply is this: the reason those
psychological structures appealed to on a RS view count as the features in virtue of
which agents are responsible is that those structures are the focus of our existing
judgments of responsibility. Inasmuch as a theory of responsibility is properly
beholden to our ordinary judgments about cases, we answer the “why these
structures?” question by appeal to their centrality in our responsibility assessments.
So, even if these structures are parasitic on reasoning capacities in some fundamental
way, it is those higher-level psychological structures to which we are responding in
our responsibility assessments, and it is the presence of these specific structures (and
possibly, the absence of specific structures or properties) that constitute one’s being
a responsible agent. On this account, the gap between those psychological structures
and the warrant for praise and blame is bridged by our basic epistemology of moral
responsibility. 
One virtue of this reply is that it permits the RS theorist to concede a kind of
dependence on underlying rational capacities, without thereby surrendering the need
for a distinctively RS account of moral responsibility. However, for this strategy to
succeed it needs some warrant to motivate its central claim that RS views are
uniquely good at capturing the phenomena of ordinary judgments of responsibility.
Fortunately for the RS theorist, there appears to be some evidence of just this sort.
In a recent discussion of the relevance of experimental data for moral
theorizing, Doris and Stich have pointed to a series of provocative experiments
conducted by Woolfolk, Doris, and Darley.12 What these experiments seem to show
is that attributions of responsibility tend to track an agent’s identification with the
action; identification or its absence is the most salient trigger of our assessments of
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responsibility. If that is correct, then this is exactly the sort of evidence the RS
theorist might hope to find: evidence for a tight conceptual link between RS-favored
psychological structures and the warrant for praise and blame. 
Woolfolk et al. have subjects consider a scenario in which they are told about
two couples that are friends, returning from a vacation together. One of the
members of this group of four adults, Bill, has learned that his wife (Susan) and his
best friend (Frank) have been involved in an illicit love affair with each other. The
subjects are told that Bill has just discovered proof. The subjects are then given one
of several different versions of the case. In the low identification version of the case
Bill decides that he is going to confront Susan and Frank, but that he has resolved
not to stand in their way if they want to be together. In the high-identification
version of the case, Bill decides that he will kill Frank. The philosophically interesting
results emerge in the high identification case. Subjects in the high identification
version of the case are told that before Bill does anything, hijackers take over the
plane and things eventually get to a situation where Bill is ordered by the hijackers to
shoot Frank, and he does so. What Woolfolk et al. discovered was that subjects are
more willing to judge high-identification Bill as more responsible, more appropriately
blamed, and more properly subject to guilt than low-identification Bill. Even more
remarkably, this was so even in scenarios where the hijackers were described as
having additionally administered to Bill a “compliance drug” that forced him to
behave exactly as they ordered. That is, even in the presence of multiple
overdetermining elements to Bill’s action, subjects were more willing to hold high-
identification Bill responsible, as compared to low-identification Bill. So, what
Woolfolk et al. seemed to have found was that ascriptions of responsbility very
tightly track identification.13 
In light of results such as these, the RS theorist might have some reason to
claim that RS theories are uniquely well-suited to capturing distinctive phenomena of
the sort manifested in the Woolfolk et. al. results. (Indeed, one could even think that
not only do these results favor a specifically identificationist RS account, they even
suggest—as Frankfurt himself famously argued—that alternative possibilities are no
requirement on moral responsibility.14) So, one might think we have an answer to the
challenge facing RS views. The evidence for our tracking identification in
responsibility ascriptions seems to support the idea that identification is central to
our concept and practices of moral responsibility.   
3. Against the new argument for RS theories
The Woolfolk et al. results are provocative, but less than the RS theorist needs. First,
it is far from clear that empirical data alone will be sufficient to demonstrate that RS
accounts can explain the special status of those psychological features they identify,
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apart from their relationship to rational capacities. That is, even if there are some
phenomena that RS theories are particularly well-suited to explain—let us suppose
the Woolfolk et al. capture such phenomena—these considerations have to be
balanced against the costs of accepting the theory, especially given the costs and
benefits of alternative accounts. (Here, recall the aforementioned worries regarding
manipulation and sanity.) So, the most we can expect from data of this sort is
support for one premise in a more complicated argument for RS views. 
There is a second, and more powerful reason to be doubtful about the
overall utility of these examples. To put it simply: you don’t need an RS theory to
account for these results. To see why, think about the general issue of how we
become responsible for what flows from our habits and character. A very natural
way to accommodate the idea that we are responsible for actions deriving from
character and habit is to think that our choices shape us, and that in turn, we are
shaped by those features of our character that are built up out of individual choices.
On this picture, as we make choices they slowly come to form settled habits of
character.15 Sometimes this operates on the basis of habituation. In other cases, it
might arise as a consequence of settling on an explicit, self-governing policy that
filters the agent’s downstream deliberative options.16 If I have a policy of starting the
coffee pot immediately after getting out of bed, this policy will typically have the
result of filtering out other deliberative options when I get out of bed (e.g., checking
email, reading the latest news, firing up the waffle iron, etc.). Whether by habit or
self-governing policy or both, prior choices can permit us to extend our powers of
agency into the future in comparatively stable and reliable ways.  
Considerations such as these have given rise to widespread acceptance of
what can be called a tracing theory of moral responsibility.17 On this picture, one way
we can be responsible for what we do is by being responsible for who we are. This
capacity is important, as much of what we do is a product of habits, policies, and
character traits. It is by being responsible for the formation of these habits, policies,
and character traits that we come to be responsible for much of what we do. That is,
we can trace our responsibility for actions that derive from habits, policies, and
character traits back to our antecedent choices that led to those aspects of ourselves. 
Tracing is an important part of the repertoire of most theories of
responsibility. Tracing helps to explain away many of the cases that might otherwise
appear to be accommodated only by an RS account. Tracing does this by permitting
us to say that for any putative instance of responsibility, responsibility need not be
accounted for by appeal to the presence of (for example) rational capacities at the
time of action. Instead, all that is needed is some prior decision, character trait, habit,
or policy that itself constitutes responsible choice (where this includes possession of
some suitable knowledge), under conditions where those things were arrived at
through the operations of the requisite agential features. So, suppose Kevin has the
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deplorable policy of insulting any student who comes to speak to him during office
hours. And, suppose that Kevin is no longer reflective at all about this practice, and
not sensitive to moral considerations that weigh against it. However, when Kevin
formed this policy he was alive to those considerations and simply decided to dismiss
them—perhaps even welcoming their deterrent effect on students visiting him
during office hours. Now, though, when Kevin’s students arrive to office hours, he
habitually says (with a loud chuckle): “What stupid question are you too dumb to
answer on your own?” On a tracing theory, the most natural thing to say about
Kevin is that he is responsible for insulting his student. After all, he was carrying out
a policy that he formed freely and responsibly (e.g., on a Reasons account, under
conditions of rational self-governance). That his later deployment of that policy was
unreflective and automatic is immaterial given the presence of that prior anchor in
suitable features of agency.18 Similarly, a drunk driver does not get off the moral
hook simply because at the time he hit someone with his car he was especially
intoxicated, and thus not responsive to reasons. In such cases, we look back to
earlier decisions to, for example, begin drinking when there was reason to think one
might come to drive, or in adopting habits of excessive drinking, or in deciding
against being cautious about the risks of drinking, and so on.    
Once we recognize the possibility of tracing, it is difficult to see how
examples of the sort generated by Woolfolk et al. require an RS view. Opponents of
RS views will simply insist that Bill’s responsibility for his killing Frank is grounded
in his (free) decision to kill Frank, prior to the actions of the hijackers. While Bill
might not have envisioned the particular details of how we was going to kill Frank,
his deciding to do so is a sufficient anchor for tracing responsibility. As long as there
is no reason to suppose the prior decision violated one’s (non-RS) conditions of
responsible agency, then there is no reason to rule out this sort of tracing. That the
hijackers coerced Bill might involve some diminution of responsibility—which is,
anyway, consistent with the responses Woolfolk, et al. received. However, such
concern does not mean that Bill cannot be held morally responsible for pulling the
trigger. 
So, a critic of RS theories is unlikely to be moved by the Woolfolk et. al.
evidence. However, the proponent of an RS theory will surely object that there is a
crucial element of the results that have not yet been addressed: where there is more
identification there is more willingness to ascribe responsibility. Indeed, one might
think, this is the most important result arising from those experiments. So, the RS
proponent might say, even if critics can explain why people might think Bill is
responsible in cases where there is a compliance drug present, the data still supports
the idea that what is central to our ascriptions of responsibility is identification. 
However, there is a natural reply to be made to this point as well. While it is
true that the data provide something of an initial warrant for thinking that
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identification is central to how we ascribe and think about the requirements for
moral responsibility, this is also consistent with thinking that identification matters to
us only evidentially. That is, our tracking whether an agent identifies with some
outcome or act is a piece of evidence for some more metaphysically or normatively
salient property to which identification points. So, for example, suppose we had the
view that responsibility depends on, roughly, (1) whether an agent is capable of
rational self-governance in that particular context and (2) whether the agent has done
something morally wrong. On this view, we ordinarily have good reason to track
whether an agent identifies with his or her action in a given context. Whether an
agent identifies with an act counts as a good piece of evidence for thinking the agent has
the relevant rational capacities in that context. Why think that? Well, one might think it for
exactly the sort of reason suggested by Frankfurt in “Freedom of the Will and the
Concept of a Person”: identification strongly suggests —even ultimately requires—
the presence of rational self-governance. Where there is identification there is
rational, reflective agency. Note, moreover, that this is a perfectly general point, one
that does not necessarily require a Reasons view. For example, suppose you thought
that the central agential feature that is crucial to moral responsibility is the presence
or absence of ill will.19 On such a view, identification will plausibly be important to
our epistemology of responsibility. However, its importance is derivative. It is a
byproduct of our inability to directly access what we are really interested in, whether
it is ill will, rational capacities, or something else. 
So, it seems, the Woolfolk et al. data do not settle the matter or even
obviously favor the RS theorist. Consequently, RS theorists have not yet identified a
special conceptual connection between, on the one hand, praise and blame and on
the other hand, those psychological structures implicated by RS views.20 Minimally,
what is required is a different set of experimental results, results whose experimental
model controls for the possibility that identification (or some other RS property) has
only an evidential role to play. Until we see such an experiment and the attendant
results, it seems that the RS theorist cannot appeal to experimental data for forging a
link between the theory’s preferred psychological structures and praise and blame. 
4. Is the best defense is a good offense?
Thus far, I have argued that the familiar distinction between RS and Reasons
approaches to moral responsibility is less clear than one might think. In particular, I
have argued that RS views are under pressure to show that there is some reason to
think that the psychological features highlighted by one’s preferred RS account have
a special status, apart from being evidence of the rational faculties of agents. If they
cannot show this, then it suggests that RS theorists fail to have a distinctive approach
to accounting for moral responsibility, and more importantly, that the focus on a
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“real self” constitutes a misidentification of the features of agency in virtue of which
moral responsibility obtains. I then considered a line of reply that makes use of
recent empirical data suggesting that ordinary attributions of responsibility tightly
track identification. In reply, I noted that appeals to tracing and the evidential role of
identification permit non-RS accounts to explain away the experimental evidence.
The appeal to tracing, though, is important. Without tracing, the principal alternative
to RS accounts —Reasons accounts—do not obviously have the resources to explain
away the persistence of our responsibility attributions under conditions where agents
do not seem to be actively exercising rational capacities.  
It is on this issue where RS theorists might plausibly go on the offensive.
Although tracing is common in the literature of responsible agency, it has been
recently argued that these accounts are plagued by an under-appreciated difficulty.
The difficulty is this: in many circumstances the anchoring traits, habits, or policies
are adopted under conditions in which the agent has poor epistemic access to the
consequences that flow from having adopted that trait, habit, or policy.21 It is
perhaps a truism that I cannot be held responsible for some outcome unless it was
reasonably foreseeable—except where my lack of foresight is itself something for
which I am responsible. In the context of tracing theories, the worry is this: in a wide
range of cases, the aspects of our self, character, or policy which provide the basis
for many of our actions were acquired in circumstances under which we could not
foresee the implications for our future actions of our acquiring them. Or, to put it
somewhat differently, the anchors for our responsibility traces cannot secure
responsibility when the downstream effect was not reasonably foreseeable at the time
of the anchoring decision. Indeed, the more remote—temporally or
recognitionally—the context of action is from the context of the acquisition of the
trait, habit, or policy, the more significant we should expect the epistemic defect to
become. Many of the characteristics I inculcated in myself in junior high school were
doubtlessly acquired under conditions when I would or could not know about their
consequences in my more mature adult life.
How ubiquitous this problem is remains an open question. As a problem for
theories of responsibility, it depends in part on the frequency with which the theory
relies on tracing. Accounts that hold that we have free will somewhat infrequently
will face a version of this problem to a greater extent than theories that require little
or no tracing, or whose tracing does not typically involve significant temporal
extendedness. It is on this point, however, that the thin edge of the RS wedge might
be inserted. Earlier, I noted that RS theorists could make use of tracing, but need
not. Indeed, the ability of RS accounts to make sense of the responsibility of cases
like Kevin (the grumpy professor) and Bill (the homicidal cuckold) suggest that RS
accounts might yet have some decisive advantage over Reasons accounts. That is, RS
accounts might have a particularly effective way of accounting for responsibility
- 10 -
attributions if it turns out that tracing is as problematic as the above argument
suggests. 
At this point, matters are too complex to permit any sweeping claims. What
we should say partly depends on how serious the tracing worries turn out to be. If
they are very serious, then it seems to open some space for the possibility that RS
theories have appropriately identified the correct locus of concern for moral
responsibility. By focusing on the agent’s relationship to the action, as given by the
presence or absence of a particular psychological structure (identification, say) it will
be less of a concern whether the more general rational capacities that make such
psychological phenomena available are frequently operating, engaged, or otherwise
immediately present in decision-making. However, if one regards manipulation or
implantation scenarios as particularly problematic for RS accounts, or if one were
moved by the thought that RS agents can be unacceptably detached from what
reasons there are in the world, then one might instead begin to take seriously the
prospect of a distinctive form of moral responsibility skepticism. On such a view,
one might not think that responsibility is altogether impossible—only much less
frequently present than our ordinary practices would suggest.22 
Here, though, I think the Reasons theorist should resist capitulating too
quickly to either the RS view or the attenuated skepticism just mentioned. One
reason to think that tracing’s troubles are not particularly dire in the present context
is that, plausibly, even habitual, personal policy-dictated actions can be sensitive to
reasons.23 That I habitually empty my pockets on a bookshelf when I get home from
work does not preclude the following: were there something I perceived as more
important, I would respond to those considerations. I do not wish to deny that our
habits, traits, or policies can make us less able to detect relevant considerations,
moral or otherwise. At the same time, we do well to acknowledge that those same
mechanisms can enhance our responsiveness to considerations. If I had no habit of
asking my children how their day went, I would presumably fail to be aware of some
considerations that should weigh in my deliberations at least some of the time. So,
while habit, traits, and policies might sometimes diminish our appreciation for some
reasons, they can also work to make us more aware of these things than we might
otherwise be. All of which is to say that we should not so readily accept that our
reasoning capacity is paralyzed, even when it is silent in action production.24 
Where does all of this leave us? Answer: with more philosophy to do. In the
literature on moral responsibility, RS and Reasons views are frequently treated as
offering substantially different approaches to moral responsibility. My aim here has
been to show that their relationship is considerably more complicated, but in ways
that do not generally favor RS views. Moreover, the recent appeal to experimental
data by proponents of RS views is insufficient to address these worries. 
None of this is to deny that Reasons accounts face difficulties of their own.
- 11 -
Reasons accounts must explain how we can have adequate sensitivity to reasons in
cases where reasons seem to play no active role in the production of action, but
where we nevertheless find ourselves inclined to assign responsibility. I have
gestured at some initial considerations why one might think that a Reasons account
could meet this challenge, but more needs to be said. Whatever is the case about
those speculations, however, the difficulties facing Reasons views are comparatively
less daunting than those faced by RS views. In particular, it seems that Reasons views
face difficulties with tracing more sharply than do RS view only to the degree to
which RS views make themselves susceptible to manipulation concerns. It is very
difficult to see how worries about manipulation cases can be addressed without
appealing to tracing or something similar. So, RS theories are left with both the old
and the new: familiar and difficult issues with manipulation cases, but also the new
challenge of showing that what appeal there is to RS views is not symptomatic of our
deeper commitment to the primacy of reasons.25 
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Notes
1. In claiming this, I mean to bracket the larger debate about whether moral responsibility requires
indeterminism. That debate is obviously an important one, but tangential for what follows. If
indeterminism is a requirement for moral responsibility, we will still need some account of what
other features of agency are required for moral responsibility, and it is those other features that
are the subject of the present discussion. Also, in what follows I will set aside what is arguably a
third alternative in debates about responsibility—“attributionist” accounts of the sort given in T.
M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England: The
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1998); Angela Smith, “Responsibility for Attitudes:
Activity and Passivity in Mental Life,” Ethics 115 (2005): 236-71.
2. Philosophers have given various treatments of what it means to identify with the motives with
which one acts, e.g., to be satisfied with the motivating desires, to view those desires as
expressing one’s true self or true values, and so on. Variants of this picture, broadly construed,
has bee suggested in the work of, for example, David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, trans. L.
A. Selby-Bigge, and P. H. Nidditch, 2 ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978); Harry
Frankfurt, “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,” Journal of Philosophy 68, no. 1
(1971): 5-20; Gary Watson, “Free Agency,” Journal of Philosophy 72, no. 8 (1975): 205-20; Gerald
Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy (New York: Cambridge, 1988); Michael E. Bratman,
“Identification, Decision, and Treating as a Reason,” Philosophical Topics 24, no. 2 (1996): 1-18.
3. Susan Wolf, Freedom Within Reason (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).
4. I have in mind views of the sort expressed in, for example, Susan Wolf, Freedom Within Reason; R.
Jay Wallace, Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1994); John Martin Fischer, and Mark Ravizza, Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral
Responsibility (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Nomy Arpaly, Unprincipled Virtue
(New York: Oxford, 2003); Dana Nelkin, “Responsibility and Rational Abilities: Defending and
Asymmetrical View,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (2008): 497-515 and depending on some
important interpretive details, it may include such accounts as Robert Kane, The Significance of Free
Will (Oxford: Oxford, 1996) and Michael McKenna, “The Limits of Evil and the Role of Moral
Address,” Journal of Ethics 2, no. 2 (1998): 123-42.
5. Harry Frankfurt, "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person." (Henceforth: FWCP.) 
6. See, for example, some of the varied uses to which Frankfurt’s account has been put in James
Stacey Taylor, ed. Personal Autonomy: New Essays on Personal Autonomy and Its Role in Contemporary
Moral Philosophy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005). See also Michael E. Bratman,
“Autonomy and Hierarchy,” Social Philosophy and Policy 20, no. 2 (2003): 156-76.
7. Compare Susan Wolf, “Sanity and the Metaphysics of Responsibility,” in Free Will, ed. Gary
Watson (New York: Oxford, 2003). Wolf uses the notion of ‘sanity’ in a somewhat idiosyncratic
way, but the general thrust of her argument, as I understand it, is to emphasize how those
psychological structures that constitute “real selves” require further supplementation by
something akin to a reasons condition. 
8. This objection was first made in Gary Watson, "Free Agency."
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9. Indeed, there is more that Frankfurt went on to say. But in those papers that followed FWCP,
the machinery of desiderative hierarchies were re-purposed to account for other agential
phenomena (identification, whole-heartedness, and so on) and the matter of responsibility
disappeared. In a personal conversation in 1999, Frankfurt said that his views about the
requirements for moral responsibility had not changed since FWCP, which further suggests that
the work of those later hierarchical accounts, in which ‘moral responsibility’ virtually never
occurs, are not intended as replacements of the earlier account of moral responsibility. So, what
follows here are thoughts on how a RS theorist might try to address worries about the account as
an account of responsible agency, using the resources of FWCP.  
10. There are other ways one might build a RS account. As previously noted, one could appeal to the
role of an agent’s values, or of the agent’s valuings, as part of an account of what constitutes the
agent’s real self. Indeed, see Gary Watson, "Free Agency." for an attempt to explain how one
might answer the challenge he put to Frankfurt without giving up on what I have been calling a
RS picture. Alternately, one could appeal to an agent’s self-governing policies and their role in
securing cross-temporal identity of the agent. See Michael E. Bratman, "Identification, Decision,
and Treating as a Reason." It is beyond the scope of this paper to address all possible ways of
defending a RS account. Here, I can only flag my suspicion that analogs of several of the already
mentioned concerns can be brought to bear against these accounts when they are construed as
accounts of responsible agency. But this is not an argument—only an acknowledgement that the
most I can hope to show is how reflections on one RS theory leads us to a better appreciation of
some complexities obscured by the familiar RS/Reasons distinction. 
11. For discussions that take RS views, under one or another name, to be an important alternative to
what I have been calling Reasons approaches, see, for example: Susan Wolf, Freedom Within
Reason; John Martin Fischer, and Mark Ravizza, Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral
Responsibility; Elinor Mason, “Recent Work on Moral Responsibility,” Philosophical Books 46, no. 4
(2005): 343-53..
12. John Doris, and Stephen Stich, “As a Matter of Fact: Empirical Perspectives on Ethics,” in The
Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy, ed. Frank Jackson, and Michael Smith (Oxford:
Oxford, 2005); Robert L. Woolfolk et al., “Identification, Situational Constraint, and Social
Cognition: Studies in the Attribution of Moral Responsibility,” Cognition 100 (2006): 283-401.
13. This scenario was tested precisely because of concerns that in less coercive versions of the case,
there remained alternative possibilities that might fuel an incompatibilist reading of the evidence.
14. Doris and Stich explicitly use these results to argue against the intuitiveness of incompatibilism,
both of the alternative possibilities variety but also of the variety that does not require alternative
possibilities—what Michael McKenna has helpfully dubbed “source incompatibilism.” Even if
one thought that the evidence cuts against alternative possibilities accounts, I do not see how
these data get traction against source accounts. According to source incompatibilists, the removal
of alternative possibilities does not, by itself, mean that the agent wasn’t the ultimate source of
the action. It is difficult to see how one might be an ultimate source without alternative
possibilities, but this is precisely the lesson that some source incompatibilists have tried to draw
from Frankfurt-style counterexamples to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (see, Derk
Pereboom, “Defending Hard Incompatibilism,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29, no. 1 (2005):
228-47.). Conceivably, a source incompatibilist might argue that Bill was ultimately responsible
(assuming he wasn’t subject to causal determinism), and that his ultimate responsibility was not
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gotten rid of simply because he lacked alternative possibilities. Of course, a source incompatibilist
would need some account of what Bill’s sourcehood consists in, but I do not see any obvious
reason why the case of Bill prevents source incompatibilists from offering an account compatible
with the case as it has been described. (Compare the case they rely on with one where the
hijackers give Bill a pill that deterministically makes him identify with whatever action they give
him. If Bill didn’t previously identify with the action, this sort of coercion strikes me as
undermining source-hood. I wager it would also undermine the rate at which respondents
attribute moral responsibility.) Moreover, there is no reason a source incompatibilist could not
help him or herself to a tracing approach (see next section), and thus dodge the consequences of
the Woolfolk, et al., evidence in this way. 
15. Kane has proposed a picture along these lines. See Robert Kane, The Significance of Free Will.
16. This aspect of agency plays an important role in much of Michael Bratman’s work. See, for
example, many of the essays in Michael E. Bratman, Structures of Agency: Essays (New York:
Oxford University Press, USA, 2007).
17. Versions of it can be found in various places, both explicitly and implicitly. See, for example John
Martin Fischer, and Mark Ravizza, Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility; Robert
Kane, The Significance of Free Will; Laura Waddell Ekstrom, Free Will: A Philosophical Study (Boulder,
Colorado: Westview Press, 2000); Peter Van Inwagen, “When is the Will Free?,” in Philosophical
Perspectives, 3, Philosophy of Mind and Action Theory, 1989, ed. James E. Tomberlin (Atascadero, CA:
Ridgeview, 1989). Versions of a tracing principle also figure prominently in some skeptical
arguments, including those in Gideon Rosen, “Skepticism About Moral Responsibility,”
Philosophical Perspectives 18 (2004): 295-313; Galen Strawson, “The Impossibility of Moral
Responsibility,” Philosophical Studies 75 (1994): 5-24.
18. In contrast, without appealing to tracing, an RS view could say: Kevin is responsible for insulting
his students precisely because his doing it is something that expresses his RS (i.e., that he
identifies with, that he endorses, that expresses his regard for students, etc., etc.). Note: an RS
view may appeal to tracing, but it is not obvious that it must. Or, at any rate, if it must, it need
not do so very often. I flag this issue here because it is returns in a later section.   
19. See P. F. Strawson, “Freedom and Resentment,” Proceedings of the British Academy XLVIII (1962):
1-25.
20. A further reason for caution about the evidence invoked by Doris and Stich hinges on a
complexity of responsibility attributions. In a different set of experiments, Nichols and Knobe
discovered that responsibility attributions are sensitive to the way a case is framed. See Shaun
Nichols, and Joshua Knobe, “Moral Responsibility and Determinism: The Cognitive Science of
Folk Intuitions,” Nous 41, no. 4 (2007): 663-85; Shaun Nichols, “Folk Intuitions on Free Will,”
Journal of Cognition and Culture 6, no. 1 & 2 (2006): 57-86. In concrete, high affect contexts, will
ascribe responsibility even if they are told it happens in a deterministic scenario. However, when
a case is discussed abstractly, in low affect terms, responsibility attributions become much more
sensitive to disruption because of determinism (i.e., in high affect contexts, responsibility
attributions are resilient in a way they do not tend to be in lower affect contexts.) And, in the
Woolfolk et al. experiments, the cases are described in concrete, high affect ways. So, there seems
to be a further variable here that needs to be disentagled from their results.
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21. Manuel Vargas, “The Trouble With Tracing,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29, no. 1 (2005): 269-91.
For a recent reply to these worries, however, see John Martin Fischer, and Neal Tognazinni,
“The Truth About Tracing,” Nous 43, no. 3 (2009): 531-56.
22. To be sure, there are other, independent reasons for worries about the viability of Reasons views
(and, correspondingly, RS views if they indeed collapse into Reasons views) in the face of
growing experimental data about the production of human action. See, for example, the worries
raised about Reasons views in Dana Nelkin, “Freedom, Responsibility, and the Challenge of
Situationism,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29, no. 1 (2005): 181-206; Maureen Sie, and Arno
Wouters, “The Real Challenge to Free Will and Moral Responsibility,” Trends in Cognitive Sciences
12, no. 1 (2008): 3-4; Joshua Knobe, and Brian Leiter, “The Case for Nietzschean Moral
Psychology,” in Nietzsche and Morality, ed. Brian Leiter, and N Sinhababu (New York: Oxford,
2007). Elsewhere, I have attempted to address at least some of these worries. 
23. Again, I am bracketing compatibilist and incompatibilist disputes about whether one can have
unexercised capacities if determinism is true, at least for the purpose of assessing those agential
powers central to moral responsiblity. If compatibilism is true, then we will presumably have
some way of making sense of what I am saying here, by appealing to something like a
counterfactual or dispositional analysis of the capacity. If incompatibilism is true, then we can
suppose that what I am claiming is that in cases of habit I retain the relevant libertarian power of
rational action-initiation. The latter position would, however, require saying more about skeptical
pressures. 
24. Tracing might prove to be a more systematic problem for this sort of account if one thought that
responsible agency was historical in some deep and systematic sense. Fischer and Ravizza’s
account of reasons-responsiveness has this feature. They argue that irrespective of what one’s
reasons-responsive capacities might be, there will always be some historical condition that must
be satisfied for one to be a responsible agent. On accounts such as these the historical ownership
condition will introduce an element that, at least in principle, seems susceptible to the difficulties
that may arise for tracing. But whether and how there is some requirement of history on
responsible agency is a complicated matter. For an overview of the relevant literature, see Alfred
Mele, “Moral Responsibility and History Revisited,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
(forthcoming).
25. Thanks to Daniel Speak for helpful comments on this paper. Thanks also to the Radcliffe
Institute for Advanced Study at Harvard, where I worked on this paper. 
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